Epistemic Modal Eavesdropping: a straight solution to a relativist challenge by Salerno, Joe
Epistemic Modal Eavesdropping:
a straight solution to a relativist challenge
Joe Salerno
Saint Louis University
knowability@gmail.com
May 27, 2013
Abstract
A primary challenge from the relativist to the contextualist about epis-
temic modals is to explain eavesdropping data—i.e., why the eaves-
dropper is inclined to judge the speaker as having uttered an epistemic
modal falsehood (when she is so inclined), even though the speaker’s
utterance is true according to reasonable contextualist truth condi-
tions. The issue turns in large part on the strength and shape of
the data, both of which are in dispute. One complaint is that an
eavesdropper’s truth value judgments fluctuate with variations of non-
epistemic fact (even after the relevant epistemic/information states are
determined). The project here is to strengthen and reframe this com-
plaint in a debate-neutral way, and to show how a sober contextualism
can uniformly accommodate it and the standard eavesdropping data.
Along the way we reject John Hawthorne’s danger-theoretic explana-
tion of these subtleties.
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The contextualist and relativist agree that the truth value of an epistemic
possibility claim
“It might be that φ”
is sensitive to the epistemic states of members of the relevant group. For
the contextualist the relevant group is a function of the speaker’s context
of utterance, and for the relativist it is a function of the assessor’s point of
evaluation of the speaker’s utterance. The following are familiar tokens of
the contrary frameworks:
(Contextualism)
“It might/may/can be the case that φ”, uttered by x in the
epistemic sense, is true at the relevant point of assessment iff
φ is compatible with the set of propositions known by x (and
her conversational partners) at the world and time of utterance.
We’ll sometimes say, ... just in case there is a φ-world that is
epistemically accessible to x (and her conversational group).
(Relativism)
“It might/may/can be the case that φ”, uttered by x in the
epistemic sense and assessed by y, is true at the relevant point of
assessment iff φ is compatible with the set of propositions known
by y at the world and time of y’s assessment of x’s utterance.
Alternatively, ... just in case a φ-world is epistemically accessible
to y.
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The contextualist framework (not necessarily the above instance) is the
dialectical default, since it invokes machinery similar to that already at work
in the semantics of other context sensitive expressions (e.g., indexicals, and
demonstratives). Movement from the default to the more exotic relativist
framework then requires strong motivation. In that spirit the relativist
emphasizes empirical data that allegedly only she can accommodate. The
most forceful is the so called eavesdropping data. For instance, Jane is at
the bus stop wondering where her bus is, and says to her friend, “We may
have missed the bus.” George is eavesdropping nearby and mumbles, “She’s
wrong. They can’t have missed the bus. I’ve been here for an hour and
know it has not come.” A natural reading is that our eavesdropper, George,
is denying Jane’s epistemic modal claim.
At bottom the eavesdropping data has the following structure:
(Standard Eavesdropping Data)
• Speaker x utters the modal claim, “It might/may be that φ”.
• φ is compatible with the set of propositions known by x and her con-
versational partners.
• The eavesdropper y knows that ¬φ (and has no dispute with the above
compatibility claim).1 Yet,
• y is inclined to judge x’s utterance as false.
The familiar line, in Andy Egan, et.al. (2005) and John MacFarlane
(2011), is that the relativist, but not the contextualist, can straightforwardly
1Suppose this about our eavesdropper throughout.
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explain the eavesdropper’s judgment. After all, φ is compatible with the set
of propositions known by the speaker and her group, and the eavesdropper
does not dispute this. By contrast, φ is not compatible with what the asses-
sor knows, when the assessor is the eavesdropper. The relativist concludes
that her own framework, even if exotic, is superior to the dialectical default
at explaining such basic epistemic modal talk.
John Hawthorne (2007) is motivated by the concern that exotic ap-
proaches advocated by relativists, including earlier incarnations of himself,
paid “insufficient attention to the shape of the data” and are “insufficiently
imaginative and patient about trying to explain the data within a more
sober framework”. The shape, over and above what has already been de-
scribed, involves two subtleties about which the basic relativist framework
says nothing. The first, repeating von Fintel and Gillies (2008: 82), is that
not everyone agrees that the eavesdropper is inclined to judge x’s modal
claim as false. Some competent eavesdroppers fluctuate in their judgment
about x’s utterance. The second is that the inclination to judge x’s claim
as false sometimes varies with objective (i.e., non-epistemic) considerations
(even after any relevant knowledge-set is fixed). Hawthorne offers a danger-
theoretic explanation of these subtleties and the standard eavesdropping
data in his attempt to short-circuit the primary motivation for exotic ma-
chinery.
The spirit of the project is here embraced. However, Hawthorne’s de-
fense of the subtleties is unsatisfactory. We strengthen that defense and
redeliver the data more forcefully. Additionally, we argue that Hawthorne’s
danger-theoretic approach is still not patient and imaginative enough. For
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a semantic explanation of the data and its shape is available within a sober
contextualist framework. On offer is a straight solution to the relativist’s
challenge to explain eavesdropping and related data.
Non-epistemic Considerations
The centerpiece of Hawthorne’s discussion is a pair of cases meant to show
that objective considerations sometimes affect the eavesdropper’s truth value
judgments, even after the relevant knowledge-set is determined.2
Here is Hawthorne’s (2007: 94) motivation of the idea:
Given that it is easy to get into the frame of mind where I offer
‘I might be on the bus’ as an acceptable explanation of why Susy
is hiding, it is also easy to get into the frame of mind where I
[qua eavesdropper] say that ‘That’s true’ when Susy hides and
says ‘John might be on this bus’.
Hawthorne (2007: 95) considers another Susy case, but
...where I do not in fact ever travel on buses, even though Susy
does not know this. ...in this case I’m far less inclined to offer
‘I might be on the bus’ ... and far less inclined to judge Susy’s
assertion as correct.
So we have the following pair of cases. In (Bus Case 1) Susy says, ‘John
might be on this bus’ and the eavesdropper, John, is inclined to judge her
2Hawthorne should be read this way, because both parties to the debate already agree
that, prior to the determination of whose knowledge matters, some objective considera-
tions (e.g., about who is speaking/assessing, and when, etc.) affect epistemic modal truth
value judgements.
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claim as true. In (Bus Case 2) Susy utters the same sentence, but John
never rides buses and he is less inclined to judge her claim as true.
In both cases the assessor knows that he is not on the bus. So the rela-
tivist framework by itself is not equipped to explain the difference. If there is
a socio-pragmatic explanation, and if it also informs the standard eavesdrop-
ping data, then we lose the most forceful motivation for relativism. Notice
the above contextualist framework is just as impoverished, since the cases
mark no difference in the epistemic states of Susy and her conversational
partners.
Before we turn to Hawthorne’s danger-theoretic explanation of the data,
we should improve on his support for the idea that objective considerations
affect the eavesdropper’s judgments in a way that negatively affects rela-
tivism. The main worries arise from the fact that the bus cases involve
action-explaining uses of the might-claim.
Action-explaining uses of might-claims arguably involve an elided atti-
tude operator, as articulated in Hacquard (2006: 121).3 When I say, “I
might be on the bus” to explain why Susy is hiding, even though I know
that I am not on the bus, I am saying that Susy thinks I might be on the bus.
I am thereby suggesting that her thinking as much is an adequate explana-
tion of her action. Analogously, when I offer “That’s true” after Susy says,
“John might be on this bus”, in reply to (say) her interlocutor’s question,
“Why are you hiding in the bushes?”, I am advocating that her thinking
that I might be on the bus is an adequate explanation of the behavior. Inci-
dentally, the approach naturally explains the difference we are highlighting.
3The elided attitude approach is also adopted by MacFarlane (2010).
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For Susy’s thinking I might be on the bus is an adequate explanation of why
she is hiding in the bushes, only if I ever ride on buses. The critical point
is that Hawthorne’s presentation of these interesting subtleties then misses
the target in two respects. First, to the extent that the relativist already
admits that assessor’s knowledge is not activated with the action-explaining
use of the modal, the bus scenarios and the subtleties that they introduce
do not tell against the basic relativist framework. Second, and consequently,
the lessons from the bus examples are not generalizable. In particular, they
do not speak to the standard eavesdropping cases, since they definitively do
not invoke action-explaining uses of the modal. The bus cases then simply
do score a direct hit against the motivations for relativism. The next section
aims to reframe the phenomenon to better serve that purpose.
Non-epistemic Considerations Revisited
What is important to Hawthorne’s pair of cases is not that the modal is
being used to explain action, or even that eavesdropping is going on. What
matters, and what would begin to undermine the motivation for relativism,
is that objective factors generally affect the target judgements (even after the
relevant information states have been determined). And if the target judg-
ments, and by analogy the original eavesdropping data, can be explained in
this way, without appealing to assessment sensitivity, we vitiate relativism.
The following minimal pair better demonstrates the sensitivity to objec-
tive factors:
(Sunglasses 1)
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Speaker A: “My sunglasses have been missing for a week. They may
be in the ocean.”
Speaker B: “Oh have you recently been to the beach?”
Speaker A: “Yeah, I was there last week. And I haven’t seen them
since.”
A’s knowledge is compatible with his sunglasses being in the ocean, and A
appears to utter an epistemic modal truth. Now the variation:
(Sunglasses 2)
Speaker A: “My sunglasses have been missing for a week. They may
be in the ocean.”
Speaker B: “Oh have you recently been to the beach?”
Speaker A: “No. I haven’t.”
Again A’s knowledge is compatible with his sunglasses being in the ocean.
But, we are less inclined to judge A’s modal claim as true. The position has
empirical support. The narratives were presented in random order to sub-
jects with native English. The speaker’s possibility-claim was highlighted,
and the subjects were asked whether they agree or disagree that the claim
is true. 96% of 149 subjects agreed that the modal claim is true in (Sun-
glasses 1), and among those only 22% agreed with the same modal claim in
(Sunglasses 2).4
4Slicing the data another way, by allowing only the subjects’ first question/answer to
count so as not to influence the second question/answer, the study uncovered virtually
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What triggers the difference is that the sunglasses-in-ocean possibility
becomes “far-fetched”, or more remote. I do not mean “less probable”.
Lowering the probability of x winning the lottery, for instance, will not
generally reduce our tendency to judge as true the claim, “x may win the
lottery”.
The above minimal pair improves on Hawthorne’s in a number of re-
spects. First, it does not presuppose that a listener/eavesdropper, who
knows not-φ, hears the speaker’s claim, “Might(φ)”, as true. For in these
cases the listener is just as ignorant as the speaker about the truth value of φ.
As such the presentation begs no question against a relativist who wishes to
hold firmly to the general principle that no third-person information-states
are relevant for the proper evaluation of a bare (non-elliptical) epistemic
modal claim. Second, the data here makes no use whatsoever of the spe-
cial role that epistemic modals play to explain action. As such, (i) whether
the data tells against relativism is independent of any particular account of
action-explaining ‘mights’, and (ii) the prospects are better for such cases
to shed light on more standard eavesdropping data.
Still neither contextualism nor relativism speaks to the difference be-
tween the cases. In both cases the ocean scenario is compatible with what
everybody knows about the cases. Enter danger theory.
identical results. 96% of subjects who received (Sunglasses 1) as their first narrative agreed
with the modal claim. By contrast, only 23% of subjects who received (Sunglasses 2) as
their first narrative agreed with the modal claim.
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Danger Theory
Hawthorne posits a danger-theoretic use of modals in addition to a purely
epistemic use. On this use, “It might be that φ” (where φ describes some
bad consequence) expresses something true, roughly, just in case there are
nearby worlds where φ is true. However, bad consequences are not generally
playing a role in standard eavesdropping cases. So drop that bit. The
important aspect of the account is that it rightly highlights a counterfactual
reading of the modal.
Hawthorne takes the ambiguity between the purely epistemic and coun-
terfactual readings to explain why the eavesdropper is inclined to judge the
speaker as having said something false (when she is so inclined). Know-
ing that the compliment is false in actual and nearby worlds, the eaves-
dropper denies the counterfactual claim that she attributes to the speaker.
Hawthorne also emphasizes that we often waver in our assignment of truth
values in many cases including familiar eavesdropping cases. This “slip-
page”, as he calls it, is to be explained by our not knowing whether the
epistemic or counterfactual use is in play. Moreover, the ambiguity is said
to explain the revised bus cases, and for the same reason, should explain
our sunglasses cases. When the subject has been to the beach (or John
does ride on buses), the speaker’s claim is readily judged true because it is
apparently true on either reading. But when our subject has not been to
the beach (or John never rides on buses), then there are no nearby worlds
where the sunglasses find their way to the ocean (or nearby worlds where
John is on the bus). So, on the counterfactual reading, the claim is naturally
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heard as false. By contrast, on the purely epistemic reading, the claim is
naturally heard as true. Hence, not knowing which use is in play, we are
less inclined to judge the modal claim as true. In a word, the ambiguity of
‘might’ (and the eavesdropper’s semantic confusion) is Hawthorne’s expla-
nation of the data, including the standard data otherwise thought to bolster
the relativists’ program.
A disappointment is that danger theory is unable to explain enough of
the relativists’ core data. The relativist’s challenge in MacFarlane (2011) is
not only to explain why the eavesdropper is inclined to judge the speaker in
error (when she is so inclined), but also why in some of those same cases (1)
we take the eavesdropper and speaker to be in a state of disagreement (i.e.,
to be in circumstances where they cannot both speak the truth), and (2) the
speaker is inclined to retract her initial claim (later) upon learning of the
eavesdropper’s perspective. Danger theory falls short here. If the danger-
theoretic explanation is correct while the speaker is making an epistemic
modal claim, then our judgmental eavesdropper is simply confused about
which reading is in play. Hence, it remains unclear why the speaker would
be inclined to retract after learning of the eavesdropper’s criticism. More-
over, both may speak the truth since the speaker is affirming the epistemic
claim and the eavesdropper is denying the counterfactual claim. The very
possibility of a genuine epistemic modal disagreement between them is un-
accounted for by danger-theory. So, if the epistemic reading of the speaker’s
claim is salient to us, as it is supposed to be in the relativists’ presentation
of the data, then it remains unclear why we would ever judge the speaker
and eavesdropper to be in a genuine state of disagreement.
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Another problem for danger theory is that when the epistemic reading
is salient, we still get slippage. Ply the narratives with epistemic cues:
use ‘may’ instead of ‘might’ since it is harder to read counterfactually, and
make explicit the speaker’s purely epistemic reasons for making the modal
claim. Then notice that our pretheoretical intuitions (qua more informed
eavesdropper) still waver. And our judgements about whether the speaker
and an arbitrary eavesdropper are in a state of disagreement are no more
decisive.
A further concern is that no explanation has been given as to why the
eavesdropper would hear the false, rather than the true, reading of the
speaker’s might-claim. Does not charity usually select the latter?5 Perhaps.
But sometimes the more natural reading is the false or more confusing read-
ing. Consider a context where one utters the following apparent joke, “Two
guys walked into a bar. The third guy ducked.” Listeners do not often un-
derstand this. The second sentence appears to be a non sequitur, because
the hearer latches onto the more expected reading of the first sentence, in
which ‘bar’ means ‘pub’. The less expected reading of ‘bar’ (as ‘a horizontal
rod or pole’) is needed to facilitate our understanding of the second sentence.
Perhaps analogously the counterfactual reading of the speaker’s might-claim
is more expected than the purely epistemic reading. But if something like
this is going on, then the details are owed by the danger theorist.
Finally, danger theory must deny that there are any cases where the
eavesdropper correctly denies, genuinely disagrees with, or elicits an appro-
priate retraction on, the speaker’s epistemic modal claim. Otherwise, since
5I thank **** for the additional objection.
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danger theory says nothing about these interesting cases, relativism can de-
clare exclusive jurisdiction over them, and the debate is right back where
we started.
Next we consider a sober non-error-theoretic, simple contextualist frame-
work that is in a position to accommodate our data—viz., that in some of the
target cases (1) the speaker S is in a position to assert an epistemic modal
claim, (2) the eavesdropper E correctly judges that S uttered an epistemic
modal falsehood, (3) we correctly judge that S and E are in a state of gen-
uine epistemic modal disagreement, and (4) S would be right to retract, upon
later learning of E and her improved epistemic circumstances. Moreover, (4)
our truth value judgments about a third-party’s epistemic possibility claim
may waver (even after the relevant information-set is determined), and (5)
sometimes this wavering is accompanied by shifts in remoteness of the target
possibility.
Sober Contextualism
Following Angelika Kratzer’s (1981) perfectly general modal semantics, the
semantic value of a modal operator in context is associated with a quantifi-
cational force (e.g., existential or universal), a restricted base set of a worlds
(e.g., epistemically or deontically accessible), and an ordering relation on
that base (e.g., comparative similarity to the distinguished target world(s),
which may or may not include the world of evaluation).6 When the modal
base is epistemic, Kratzer favors “stereotypical” target worlds, the source
6MacFarlane (op.cit.: 145) acknowledges that for the contextualist the modal base will
be ordered, but does not explore the consequences of that detail for his eavesdropping
arguments. We do that here.
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of which is “a suitable normalcy standard” at the world of evaluation. Her
ordering relation for epistemic modals is comparative similarity to those
“stereotypical” worlds. Accordingly, “It might be that φ” in the epistemic
sense is true on this account just in case some of the epistemically accessible
worlds that are most similar to the stereotypical target worlds are φ-worlds.
Stereotypical target worlds incur too high a price on the logic. The world
of evaluation, w, need not be most similar to the stereotypical world(s) by
the normalcy standard at w. But then φ may be true at w, even though φ
is false at all worlds most similar to the stereotypical worlds. Consequently,
we lose the principle that all truths are epistemically possible. Things are
even worse when, like Kratzer, we treat the indicative conditional as a spe-
cial case of epistemic modality. For then the indicative will be true, roughly,
just when all the epistemically accessible antecedent-worlds that are most
similar to the stereotypical worlds are consequent-worlds. Modus ponens
fails unacceptably, because the analysis allows for the consequent to be
false at an actual antecedent-world that is not most similar to stereotypical
worlds, even though the consequent is true at all epistemically accessible
antecedent-worlds that are most similar to stereotypical worlds. To avoid
these breakdowns in logic, it is better to treat the world of evaluation as
the target world. For then the world of evaluation will always be at least as
close to the target world(s) as any other world is. For that is the relation
(known as weak centering) that is needed to preserve modus ponens.7
7Incidentally, we favor a nearness relation that is constrained by the limit assumption,
strong connectedness and weak centering, but not by anti-symmetry or strong centering.
Those details do not directly concern the present discussion.
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The truth condition favored here for epistemic possibility claims is this:
(Sober Contextualism)
“It might/may/can be the case that φ”, uttered in context c, is true
at world w iff some closest-to-w epistemically accessible world is a
φ-world, where epistemic accessibility is a function of c, and φ is con-
tingent and non-modal.
This allows objective circumstances to affect the truth values of our epis-
temic modal claims, even while holding fixed the epistemic base. After all,
whether some world is comparatively closer than another to a world w de-
pends on, among other things, the contingent (non-epistemic) facts at w.
And the motivation for building this in is independent of present concerns.
Epistemic modal claims are not solely a statement about consistency with
the modal base. They typically express contingent, a posteriori, informative
propositions.
The account treats the target data. Closeness considerations naturally
explain the difference between the cases. Never riding on buses in (Bus 2)
pushes the bus-riding-worlds much further away from the world of evaluation
than they were in (Bus 1). Not having been to the beach in (Sunglasses 2)
pushes the sunglasses-in-ocean-worlds much further away from the world of
evaluation than they were in (Sunglasses 1). That explains the decreased
inclination to judge the modal claims as true in the Case-2-examples. For
on the above account, epistemic possibility implies nearness of possibility.
What about slippage and eavesdropping? Sober Contextualism predicts
slippage, even if an epistemic reading is the only one available. To the extent
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that the narrative is vague about the relative distance of the possibility under
consideration, competent verdicts will waver about the truth of the epistemic
modal claim. And this of course does not presuppose that we’re confused
about whether the use is epistemic. The vagueness of closeness can be in play
even on a saliently epistemic reading. So the account explains the slippage
data better than danger theory, which requires confusion (and sometimes
error) about whether the speaker is expressing an epistemic claim.
Moreover, to the extent that an eavesdropper is more informed than the
speaker about objective considerations that indicate the remoteness of the
possibility under consideration, she can correctly judge the speaker to have
uttered an epistemic modal falsehood (even when the compliment is com-
patible with the set of propositions known by the speaker and her conversa-
tion partners). Consequently, the eavesdropper’s more informed perspective
(with respect to these closeness-determining matters of fact) can explain
her (and our own) inclination to judge the speaker as having said something
false, and accordingly, the speaker’s inclination to retract when (later) ap-
praised of the eavesdropper’s perspective. Additionally, a genuine epistemic
modal disagreement is possible between the speaker and eavesdropper, on
this view, because enough shared content is secured between them. The
speaker affirms a proposition that is true just in case the compliment is true
at a closest world compatible with, say, what the speaker knows; while the
eavesdropper denies the proposition that is true under those circumstances.
She can deny this, for instance, by simply saying, “No. What the speaker
just said is false”.
What about when the eavesdropper directly denies the modal claim?
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Instead of merely denying that the speaker said something true, the eaves-
dropper may state, “No. It can’t be that φ” or “No. It’s false that it might
be that φ”.8 Is the eavesdropper disagreeing with the speaker? Not obvi-
ously. My own intuitions waver. But suppose there are some cases like this
where we decisively attribute a genuine dispute. It might be objected that
our framework cannot handle such cases on the grounds that the eavesdrop-
per’s denial concerns only information possessed by her own conversational
group. Accordingly, we mistakenly predict that our speaker and eavesdrop-
per are talking past one another.
The sober contextualist has a number of good potential replies. She may
claim that the eavesdropper is denying the counterfactual modal claim—a
claim that is true just in case there are nearby φ-worlds. And since deny-
ing that claim entails the denial of the epistemic modal claim, the speaker
and eavesdropper genuinely disagree! Alternatively, she can explain how the
eavesdropper, even with the new wording, is able to deny directly the very
same epistemic claim that the speaker is affirming. For instance, one de-
velopment of our position says that “epistemic accessibility” is determined
by the function, “all and only those practical deliberators salient in the
speaker’s conversational context”.9 Then, so long as the original speaker S
is the salient deliberator in the eavesdropper’s conversational context, the
8Re-characterizing the narrative this way, MacFarlane (2010) aims to avoid the objec-
tion that the eavesdropper is targeting the prejacent—i.e., is merely denying φ.
9Cases that support this account of who is relevant, and that support the occasional
irrelevance of the speaker, include but are not limited to cases where epistemic modals are
used to explain, guide, or evaluate third-party action. The position is defended at length
in ****.
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eavesdropper can use “It can’t be that φ” to deny the very same epistemic
modal claim that S has affirmed. Either of these options would provide us
with a straightforward semantic explanation of this variation of the disagree-
ment data.
Where does Sober Contextualism stand on issues of epistemic “faultlessness”—
i.e., on the intuition that both parties are well-positioned to make the claims
that they are making (even if they genuinely disagree)? This phenomenon
is not special to epistemic modal discourse. I can have good reason to think
that φ, even if φ is false and somebody else has good reason to think φ is
false. Analogously, suppose Monday John told me he is considering seri-
ously a Tuesday departure for Boston, and I know he travels there for his
company quite often. Then on Tuesday I can be well-positioned to make a
modal claim that requires for its truth that there be nearby worlds where
John has departed for Boston. And no less so, if in fact there are no such
nearby worlds, say, because (unbeknownst to me and John) John’s company
on this special occasion has no money to pay for travel. This sort of fault-
lessness is not precluded by the kinds of cases we have been considering or
by the kinds of explanations we have been providing. A speaker may falsely
claim something that requires closeness, while being well-positioned to claim
it. It is true that on our account epistemic possibility claims are not as easy
to assert as they would otherwise be if their truth values depended solely
upon the speaker’s epistemic states. But that is not to admit that these
claims are usually too difficult to assert.
Sober Contextualism falls nicely under Kratzer’s elegant, simple and per-
fectly general approach to modality. It avoids the need for error-theoretic,
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socio-pragmatic, and exotic explanations of the interesting data, and instead
opts for a straight solution to the central relativist challenge by explaining
eavesdropping, retraction and disagreement considerations with familiar re-
sources. Additionally it is best positioned to explain the subtleties in the
shape of the data—subtleties that for the most part are overlooked in the
literature.
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